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RELATED-PARTY-TRANSACTIONS IN THE SPANISH STOCK MARKET
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Despite the relevance of related-party transactions (RPTs) in the capital markets, empirical evidence on RPTs is absent in the Spanish capital market. Thus, in the current work we provide novel evidence on the configuration of RPTs for Spanish listed firms along the period 2004-2014. Our results show a significant presence of RPTs, with more than half of listed Spanish firms committing to RPTs. Moreover, our results show that RPTs are greater in large-cap companies, in companies with higher ownership concentration, in firms effectively controlled by a family and in those companies where controlling owners’ voting-cash flow wedge is higher.
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